This paper examines how different ethical positions view various types of animal advocacy campaigns concerning a product produced using animals. The ethical positions represent common company, social, and animal advocate viewpoints.
Introduction
Groups advocating animal welfare or rights often try to alter how animals are used in the production of goods and services including food (Compassion in World Farming, 2014) , clothing (Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade, 2014), and entertainment (League against Cruel Sports, 2014) . The campaigns available for advocacy groups are many, as they can act on demand, supply, or regulation of those products. For example, the Vegan Society (2014) urges people to avoid animal products entirely, while the Animal Liberation Front (2014) engages in direct action against producers and suppliers, and Animal Defenders International (2014) presses governments to introduce bans on animal use.
There are also many different ethical positions for evaluating such campaigns.
Clearly, there are differences between the interests of the advocacy groups and producers, but there can also be clashes with consumer and societal viewpoints.
Among animal advocates as well there can be disagreements about objectives, with some groups such as the RSPCA and CIWF primarily pursuing welfare reforms rather than abolition of animal use and others such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the Animal Liberation Front working towards full abolition. Even if animal advocates agree on long term goals, disagreements among animal advocates often extend to the campaign methods they employ, such as whether pressing for short term animal welfare gains is consistent with long term abolition of animal use (Francione, 1996; Singer, 2008; FARM, 2013) .
The questions addressed in this paper are as follows. How do markets respond to different animal advocacy campaigns? How do different ethical positions view each type of campaign? What campaigns attract broad support while allowing advocates to work towards their objectives, and when are disagreements most acute?
We answer these questions through several modelling steps. We start by representing six ethical positions in terms of which quantity or quantities they use to evaluate outcomes in a market for a good that uses animals in production. The ethical positions represent common company, social, and animal advocate viewpoints. Next, algebraic expressions for the ethically relevant quantities are derived in terms of market inputs. Then seven campaigns are characterised in terms of what inputs they change, and the value attached to each campaign by each ethical position is calculated by differentiation or discrete differencing of the ethically relevant quantities with respect to the campaign inputs. The campaigns are either consumer oriented, technologically oriented, collaborative with companies, or direct action.
Section two describes common ethical positions on animal use, section three describes and solves the model, section four looks at how campaigns are assessed by each ethical position, and section five concludes.
Ethical positions on animal use
In this section we present six ethical positions on the merits of animal advocacy campaigns. The first two ethical positions relate to standard economic assumptions about the behaviour of companies (which we term "company interests") and consumers ("consumer interests"), and the third allows for general public concerns about animal welfare ("public concern"). The fourth ethical position takes animal welfare as the basis for its ethics ("animal welfare"), while the fifth ("logic of the larder") takes a modified welfarist position which asserts bringing animals into existence is beneficial. The final position uses animal rights as a foundation for its judgement ("animal rights").
Company interests
A default assumption in economics on the operation of businesses is that they operate only to maximise profits. Our first ethical position is an amoral one (with respect to animal welfare) that justifies such behaviour. Its only criterion for supporting or opposing a campaign for changing animal use by companies is whether profits are increased by it. Animal welfare and rights are irrelevant. As globally the majority of chickens and pigs are raised in intensive systems (Robinson et al, 2011, pp. 54, 57) with low welfare, profit maximisation is plausibly the main motivation behind animal rearing.
Consumer interests
Economic modelling of markets commonly assumes that consumers maximise their own welfare (or utility) in choosing to buy a good or not. Our second ethical position justifies the behaviour, and evaluates the merits of a campaign solely in terms of whether consumer utility is increased. The position is not inconsistent with concern about animal welfare, as consumers may consider it when they are making their decisions. Given the intensive systems in which most animals are raised for food, animal welfare does not seem to be a critical element in many purchase decisions.
When consumers allow for animal welfare in making their decisions, they may tradeoff animal welfare against other preferences such as taste or social conformity. For example, Frank (2006) presents a model in which animal discomfort reduces human utility and can be offset by utility derived from consumption.
Animal welfare
Our next ethical position assesses campaigns in terms of their animal welfare alone.
The position may be supported by welfarists who see welfare as the main objective of reform, or by animal right advocates who see welfare reforms as an intermediate or more achievable outcome. Midgley (2008) presents a welfarist position, arguing that society accepts the death of food animals, but not the welfare consequences of intensive farming. She says that humanitarians and farmers can work together for welfare gains. Similar welfarist calls for reform and inclusion of ethical concerns in animal use are made in Fraser (1999) and Rollin (1990) . Singer (2008) starts from a rights position, but argues that even if abandonment of animal use in agriculture is an advocate's aim, they should support welfare improvements as abandonment will happen very slowly. The animal welfare position has a strong influence on applied animal advocacy, through the work of welfarist groups such as the RSPCA and groups with ultimate animal rights aims such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.
Public concern
The next ethical position we describe is one in which campaigns are evaluated in terms of their effect on buyer utility, and additionally on separate animal welfare.
Thus, there is the potential for the campaign's effect on animal welfare to be considered twice, once in the buyer's utility function (if welfare enters it) and again by direct evaluation. There are a number of reasons why such an ethical position might be influential. As Cowen (2006) and Fearing and Matheny (2007) note, an externality arises as animal lovers suffer disutility from the poor treatment of animals in a market transaction in which they do not participate. Thus, products in which animals are badly treated are typically underpriced under a conventional externality argument, and an ethical position which allows for animal welfare twice may reflect social preferences more closely than market pricing. The social preferences may become institutionally recognised or enforced by government, who may moreover choose to recognise animal welfare as an explicit social good independently of buyer preferences. Blackorby and Donaldson (1992) specify social value functions in which human and animal utilities are combined.
Logic of the larder
The ethical position termed the "logic of the larder" (Salt, 1914) proposes that animals derive a benefit from living, independently of any happiness or pain experienced during life. So animals can enjoy a positive benefit from being created for production purposes even their lives are miserable. The idea has long provenance, with Salt 
Animal rights
Our sixth ethical position evaluates campaigns in terms of the extent of animal use in production. If a campaign reduces the extent of animal use, it is viewed favourably.
Regan (1986) and Francione (1996) both propose that no matter how well animals are treated, animals should not be used as resources for human purposes. Regan (1986) asserts that animals have a right to respect for their independent value as distinct from their value to others. Francione (1996) claims that animals have the right not to be treated as property by humans. He argues that advocacy should take the form of pushes for prohibition of aspects of animals' property status, while avoiding reinforcing other aspects of that status when doing so. We recognise that animal use as a measure of animal rights does not allow for advances through legal protection, but as the core of our working model is a market rather than legislative process, the measure describes the part of animal rights gains possible within this model alone.
Model
In this section we present our model of a market for a product which uses animals in production. It consists of a monopolist company selling to a representative consumer who may have preferences about the welfare of animals used. The monopolist first chooses the welfare for animals used in production, and then sets prices for the finished good. The separation of the welfare setting decision from the pricing decision is also made in Ahmadi et al (2011) , where only the welfare decision is analysed and the pricing is taken as exogenous. In analyses of pollution with some similarities with our work, Cremer and Thisse (1999) 
and van der Made and
Schoonbeek (2009) separate the choice of polluting technology from that pricing. We solve the model for profits, consumer utility, animal welfare, and numbers of animals killed. Changes in these quantities determine how campaigns are viewed in each of the ethical positions described in section two. In the next section we consider how various actual campaigns alter the quantities.
Specification
A profit maximising company produces a good using animals and other inputs. The company is assumed to face no competitors (analysis of a competitive market is discussed in the conclusion). Each unit of the good produced is associated with the death of one animal in production (the nature of the results is not sensitive to the number of animals killed and the assumption makes for clearer algebra).
Each unit of the good is produced at a cost attributable to two components. The first component relates to how well the animals are treated in production, and rises in proportion to the square of their welfare. Welfare is measured by a single scalar quantity w. Animal welfare has multiple dimensions and interpretation (Broom, 1991) , and some of the dimensions not be readily comparable or may be unrelated (Hubbard and Scott, 2011; Ingemann et al, 2009 ). However, we translate from humans to animals the standard economic practice in using a scalar measure to evaluate welfare, thereby following Blackorby and Donaldson (1992) . The second component of cost relates to all other inputs of production and is a constant value a.
Thus, total costs are
where q is quantity sold and b is a constant.
A representative consumer derives utility from consuming the good, subject to declining marginal utility described by a quadratic curve. They derive increased utility from better animal welfare when the good is produced, with constant marginal utility. The consumer also gets a constant marginal utility normalised at one from consumption of a basket of other goods, whose quantity is measured by G. Thus, their utility U is given by
(2) for constants c, d, and e.
Representative consumer models are standard in the industrial economics literature (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, chapter 5) , and have been used to calculate jointly price and endogenous pollution levels in an industry (Stathopoulou, 2014) . However, we also experimented with various specifications with consumer heterogeneity, rather than a representative consumer model. One specification followed van der Made and
Schoonbeek's (2009) model of pollution valuation, having heterogeneity only in consumer valuation of the merits of welfare. This specification resulted in companies choosing to have either the minimum or maximum possible welfare levels, which did not give informative results when we calculated marginal effects of campaigns.
Another specification had heterogeneity in valuation both of welfare and the other features of the good. The company optimisation did not lead to compact algebraic solutions as given in the main part of this paper. We prefer here to work with explicit solutions rather than opt for numerical analysis.
The representative consumer has a budget of M, a constant. The price of the good is p and the price of the basket of other goods is normalised at one, so that the budget constraint is
(3)
Solution
We first solve for the representative consumer's demand for the good at any price p and welfare w. The consumer's utility U in equation 2 given the budget constraint in
Differentiating with respect to q, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for q
The company earns a net income per sale of 2 bw a p − − .
Its profits Π when price is p and welfare is w are given by (up to a scaling constant to allow for population size)
We change variables from p to x under the substitution
Since the second bracket is the quantity sold, it is positive and the expression is
. Profits are then
The optimum is obtained at
At the solved values of p and w, profits are given by
As described in section two, changes in profits are the basis of evaluating advocacy campaigns in the ethical position we term company interests.
Consumer utility is given by
Total consumer utility and average per person utility are both maximised together as the population size is not endogenous 
Changes in this quantity are how we evaluate advocacy campaigns in the ethical position termed here as public concern. The main variable of concern is constructed by direct addition of utility and welfare, and alternative combinations of the two could be made in an unlimited number of ways. Direct addition has the advantages of being a simple and intuitively reasonable representation of how people or society may combine them (in the absence of any detailed econometric evidence) and leading to relatively transparent results without incursion from superfluous parameters.
The number of animals killed is bd
Changes in the number of animals killed are taken as the basis for evaluating campaign performance in the ethical position we term animal rights. The idea of selecting this quantity as the basis of evaluation is that among the variables in our model it best measures the extent to which the right not to be used in production is violated.
The total aggregated welfare is given by The measure used here offers a plausible representation of the position and is parametrically parsimonious.
We now have algebraic expressions for several variables that are relevant to the ethical positions described in section 2. These ethically relevant variables are profits (Π), utility (U), welfare (w), the sum of utility and social welfare (U + w), the quantity of animals killed (q), and total aggregated welfare (wq).
Campaigns
In this section, we consider seven types of campaigns that have been adopted by animal advocacy groups. Two of the campaigns are consumer oriented (raising consumer awareness, and boycott), one is technological (facilitating the introduction of new welfare-enhancing technology), two are collaborative (negotiation on welfare practices, and praise of reforming companies), and two are direct action (targeted direct action against low welfare standards, and general direct action). Our goal is to see how these campaigns affect quantities of interest to each ethical position. The ethical positions were described in section two, and the ethically relevant quantities were derived in algebraic form in section three. The approach adopted is to characterise campaigns as changing input variables to the market model in section four, and then differentiate or finite difference the ethically relevant quantities with respect to these variables. The sign and magnitude of the derivative or difference then
show how campaigns are evaluated within and between ethical positions.
Consumer awareness
Advocacy groups have often tried to raise consumer awareness about the welfare of animals used in production processes. Some campaigns have given information about standard practices in animal use (Compassion in World Farming, 2007; Pig-vision, 2014) , while others detail abuses committed in them (Mercy for Animals, 2014). We consider a campaign type that increases the awareness of consumers of animal welfare standards in production processes. We model its effect as an increase in the parameter e in the consumer utility function, which represents the valuation of welfare.
We can see the effect of the campaign by differentiation of profits Π with respect to e, which gives When welfare per animal w is differentiated with respect to e, the result is Differentiating total welfare, wq, across animals with respect to e yields Frank (2006) notes that increasing sensitivity to welfare conditions may have an ambiguous effect on utility. One of the mechanisms he highlights is that people's awareness of poor conditions may reduce their utility from consumption of a good, and restoring the initial utility from consumption by purchasing a good with better welfare conditions is costly, so that utility from alternative uses of the money is lost.
Thus, utility may be reduced by better information about welfare. In our model, increased sensitivity to welfare issues is an opportunity for people to gain more utility by buying goods with higher welfare standards. Frank (2006) notes this possibility by observing that people may get a "warm glow" from switching behaviour. Our model can derive the same results as Frank (2006) if we reduce utility by a large enough constant at the same time as we increase sensitivity to the welfare variable, so that buying higher welfare goods reduces utility loss rather than increasing utility relative to the starting level. We shall see in the next section that a reduction in consumption utility is associated with a decline in the quantity sold while leaving welfare unchanged. The reduction in consumption utility coupled with an increased sensitivity to welfare would represent a campaign in which consumers are told that low welfare is bad, rather than high welfare is good. Such a campaign may appeal to both animal welfare and animal rights advocates.
Strict boycott
Sometimes advocacy groups represent a product or services as inherently bad, rather than bad primarily as a result of welfare practices that can be reformed. The groups then urge a total boycott of the product. Boycotts have been urged in products and services including meat and animal products used as food (Vegan Society, 2014;
Animal Aid, 2014), circuses using animals (Animal Defenders International, 2014), animal experimentation (British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, 2014), and fur (Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade, 2014).
We consider a campaign type that portrays a product as malign and urges a boycott. 
New technology
Campaigns by advocacy groups may attempt to promote new technology with higher welfare standards than presently employed in an industry. The campaigns may support the introduction of technologies that improve the welfare of animals currently used in production rather than replacing them entirely, for instance by providing information about the technology and reducing company uncertainty about its viability. As an example, the Humane Society of the United States (2011) 
Negotiation on practices
Advocacy groups may reach an agreement with a company to improve the welfare standard used in production. . w is no longer determined endogenously, so we have to revise the pricing calculation. For a non-negative quantity, the value of w must be less than the second root of the 
Welfare w is differentiated with respect to w giving unity:
Differentiating utility per person plus welfare per animal, U + w, with respect to w,
The sign is ambiguous, depending on whether the first additive term on the right hand side is greater or less than minus one. 
and the terms on the left hand side exceed the corresponding terms on the right hand side. Thus, total welfare initially increases and then declines as welfare increases.
Praise for reform
Advocacy groups sometimes praise companies for introducing welfare reforms. The praise can be perfunctory, or more substantial and include the right to use certification provided by the advocacy group. Such certifications include the American Humane Association's Humane Heartland and the RSPCA's Freedom Food. The certifications offer the company the chance to attract new consumers who would otherwise be reluctant to consume the good.
We examine the effect of a campaign in which an advocacy group offers a company a valuable commendation in exchange for increasing their animal welfare standards.
The campaign is modelled as an exogenous increase in the welfare parameter w as in Our sixth campaign type involves direct action against a company in response to low welfare standards. The model is that the direct action causes damage or disruption to the company in proportion to the gap between the actual welfare and the level deemed minimally acceptable by the advocacy group, and so increases costs for the company in proportion to the gap. The campaigns' effect is represented as an increased cost per
, where W is the group's minimally acceptable welfare. W is no less than the market value of w,
. Thus, the unit cost of production is
The problem solved by the company is to maximise the profit function of
which is the market value of welfare, it is optimal to reduce w to W or lower. If W w ≤ then the profit function is
which has a welfare solution of b e w 2 1 + = .
If Similarly, we deduce that the campaign reduces consumer utility. As welfare rises while utility declines, the effect on their sum is ambiguous, and the same is true for total welfare as the product of the rising welfare and declining quantity.
General direct action against the company
Advocacy groups may engage in direct action because of the nature of the good or service produced, rather than because of the specific welfare standards in production.
An example of such a campaign is the smashing of an organic butcher's windows described by the Animal Liberation Front Press Office (2014), with an activist stating that the target was chosen because it sells meat, irrespective of its welfare standards.
The seventh campaign type we consider consists of direct action against a company, independent of the welfare standards it has. It is modelled by an increase in the cost of production parameter a. We can see the effect of the campaign by differentiation of the ethically relevant quantities: Inspecting the solutions here and comparing them with those in section 4.2, we see that the market outcomes of general direct action are the same as for a boycott. The reason is that in our monopolistic market model, the effect of changes in the utility parameter c and the cost parameter a are equal and opposite in effect on market outcomes, as we can see from the outcome equations in section 3.2. Notes: + means a benefit is perceived. -means a loss is perceived. 0 means neither a benefit or loss is perceived. ? means the perception of the outcome depends on market conditions. Table 1 summarises our findings of how the different ethical positions benefit or lose from each campaign. The campaign aimed at raising consumer awareness issues is favoured by all ethical positions except animal rights. The reason is that the campaign as it is framed makes animal welfare an additional consumer benefit that can be acquired by buying the product in a form with higher welfare standards. So the product can be more attractive than before. The company sells the higher welfare product, and so sales, utility, and profits increase.
Summary of campaign preferences
The boycott campaign causes losses to four of the perspectives, namely company interests, consumer interests, public concern, and logic of the larder. The product becomes less attractive, so consumers derive less benefit from buying it, and sales and profits reduce. As the campaign targets any animal usage regardless of the intensity of welfare standards, the company does not adjust the welfare of animals used. The reduction in animals killed is appealing from an animal rights position.
The campaign to promote the use of higher welfare technology is viewed positively from all ethical positions except animal rights. The campaign makes products with higher welfare more affordable, and it is optimal for the company to bring higher welfare goods to market. Profits and utility increase, as does the quantity of animals killed.
The campaign of negotiation of higher welfare brings losses to the ethical positions of company interests and consumer interests. The campaign increases welfare above the profit maximising level. With the pricing choices of the company, the consumer utility also falls and so does the quantity sold. Because of the welfare increase and quantity decline, the campaign brings benefits in the ethical positions of animal welfare and animal rights but may bring benefits or losses from the logic of the larder position depending on market conditions. From the viewpoint of public concern, the outcomes are again ambiguous.
The campaign of praising a company that introduces welfare reforms is viewed neutrally by the company interests and consumer interests viewpoints. The campaign is designed to be neutral with respect to profits, and so leaves consumer utility unchanged. The campaign increases welfare and is viewed favourably from animal welfare and public concern positions. Under monopoly pricing, changes in the concern and logic of the larder positions, the offsetting movements of their constituent elements make their evaluation of the campaign ambiguous.
The campaign of general direct action against the company is viewed negatively from company interests and consumer interests ethical positions. Costs increase, reducing profits and utility. The campaign is neutral from an animal welfare position. Because the severity of the campaign is not mitigated by raising welfare standards, no welfare changes occur. From an animal rights viewpoint, the decline in the number of animals killed means the campaign is considered beneficial. The public concern and logic of the larder positions view the campaign negatively. The work suggests a number of campaign strategies allowing advocates to simultaneously work towards welfare and rights goals when dealing with a monopolistic supplier. Firstly, both negotiation and targeted action can offer welfare and rights gains. However, consumers may be hostile to the changes, leading to potentially temporary gains unless a secondary campaign is launched to influence public opinion. Secondly, a campaign that says low welfare standards are bad and a campaign that says high welfare standards are good can both increase welfare, but only the former decreases total animal use. Thirdly, direct action campaigns that target companies can achieve welfare gains as well as reducing animal use if campaign intensity partially reduces when welfare standards rise. The campaigns would then also attract more support from beyond animal advocates.
Conclusion
There are a number of assumption changes or extensions that could be made to increase understanding of the impact of campaigns. The representative consumer model could be given fuller foundations based on consumer heterogeneity in valuations of both welfare and non-welfare characteristics of the good. As we noted in the main text, we did not do so here because the resulting optimisation problem faced by the company did not give compact algebraic solutions. As a result, numerical techniques may be required to determine outcomes.
Another extension relates to the introduction of government. In our model, campaigns act through directly changing market outcomes. The government sector could be introduced to allow for lobbying (as in Heyes and Liston-Heyes' (2005) analysis of the form of environmental lobbying) or taxes and subsidies (see Cowen (2006) ). The analysis could remain economic under a public choice or law and economics approach.
We analysed a limited range of campaigns, and other campaigns could be examined in future work. These could be variants on the ones studied here, or entirely novel ones.
A potentially informative departure could how institutional arrangements affect markets outcomes, such as whether animals are treated as property (Francione, 1996) .
The model assumes that the company is monopolistic. An alternative would be to assume a competitive market where price is set equal to cost, so that 2 bw a p + = .
The price can be substituted in the expression for utility given by equation 4, and the welfare solved to maximise utility. The solution in w is independent of q, and is . The rest of the analysis follows as described in earlier sections. We do not present the results here.
The paper indicates that all the ethical positions have a choice of campaigns to achieve their aims. A development that may be helpful to advocacy groups would be to determine their optimal portfolio of campaigns. One element of such an analysis would be the extent of output response to changes in input variables, which we have already stated in algebraic terms. Parameters could be replaced with their values estimated from econometric studies to give actual market responses. Other elements of an optimal portfolio analysis would be the extent of response of input variables to advocacy group activity, and budgeting. There is precedent for analysis of optimal welfare choices (from a company perspective of increasing profitability) in Ahmadi et al (2011) .
We have not modelled how companies may respond to campaigns beyond adjustment of price and welfare levels. In practice, targets in advocacy campaigns may respond by attempting to adjust other characteristics of the market such as market demand (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993) . The optimal sequence of responses and counterresponses could be analysed in future work, perhaps in a game theoretic setting. The different welfare valuations of the various ethical positions would then correspond to different games being played, with possibly clashing strategies and equilibria.
